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Abstract
This paper examines the fiscal and eco-
nomic implications of Iraq’s current 
demographic trajectory. We find that, 
given Iraq’s almost total dependence 
on oil for government revenues, slight 
changes in the demographic transition 
rate could result in significant cumulative 
per capita expenditure changes- equiv-
alent to $2.9bn, or approximately 7% 
of the current health budget, 9% of the 
current defence budget, or 17% of current 
aid flows. Furthermore, evidence from 
the entire Middle East and North Africa 
(MENA) region, suggests that Iraq’s rel-
atively slow demographic transition is 
reducing per capita economic growth, 
especially as it is combined with a hostile 
business environment. Specifically, using 
a panel dataset, we find that the interactive 
effect of a 1% decrease in the dependency 
ratio and a 1% decrease in the unit costs 
of starting and running a business could 
add, on average, 1.2% to GDP per capita 
in a typical MENA country. Therefore, 
investing in Iraq’s demographic transi-
tion could potentially yield significant 
economic returns. This is especially per-
tinent if the COVID-19 induced recession 
results in a significant increase in the 
budget deficit. As reducing demographic 
momentum will be equivalent to a per 
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Introduction1
This paper examines the economic implications of Iraq’s demographic transition.2 We find 
that, given Iraq’s almost total dependence on oil for government revenue, slight changes 
in the rate of demographic transition could result in cumulative per capita expenditure 
cuts or gains equivalent to 0.72% of GDP between 2020–24. Furthermore, evidence from 
the entire Middle East and North Africa (MENA) region, suggests that Iraq’s relatively 
slow demographic transition is reducing per capita economic growth, especially as it is 
combined with a hostile business environment. We find that a 1% decrease in the depend-
ency ratio combined with a 1% decrease in the cost of operating and running a business 
could add approximately 1.21% to GDP per capita.
Iraq’s demographic profile is atypical of the MENA region.3 In fact, alongside Yemen 
and Syria, its population growth is more akin to a sub-Saharan African country than its 
geographical peers. The interaction of Iraq’s current demographic profile with a hostile 
business environment, the dependence of public service provision on oil revenues, and 
the inability and unwillingness to use current oil revenues for long-term economic growth 
and economic diversification, means that Iraq’s youth bulge is likely to result in increased 
political instability, lower provision of public services and less per capita economic growth. 
However, Iraq could potentially turn its demographic profile, marked by an increasingly 
large portion of working age people, into an asset if it combined economic reforms and job 
creation with policies to support reproductive rights in order to bring down the depend-
ency ratio.4 There are good examples from other MENA countries in how to achieve this 
outcome. If this issue is not addressed directly, it is very likely that Iraq’s demography will 
undermine stability and development in the short- and long-term.
The rest of this paper is organised as follows: section one reviews the literature regard-
ing population economics – the link between demographic change and economic growth. 
Section two explores Iraq’s specific demographic profile and therefore, what the possible 
economic and political implications of this profile might be. Section three combines the data 
on Iraq’s demography with projections on economic growth and oil revenues to examine 
how variations in demographic transition might affect public finances and hence the viabil-
ity of the current social contract. Section four uses a panel data set to analyse the dynamic 
economic effects of demographic transition across MENA countries. It finds, consistent 
1   This paper greatly benefited from feedback provided by Christopher Marlow, Victoria Penson, Isam 
Taha, and two anonymous peer reviewers. The views and opinions expressed are the author’s own and 
do not necessarily reflect the views of DFID.
2   Defined as the generalised description of the changing population growth rate of a country brought 
about by changes in fertility, mortality and/or net migration. ‘The Demographic Transition. PAPP101 
- S01: Demography on the World Stage’, UNFPA (2020). Available  at: http://papp.iussp.org/sessions/
papp101_s01/PAPP101_s01_090_010.html (accessed 24 September 2020).
3   Specifically, Iraq clusters with Sudan, Egypt, the Palestinian Authority, Yemen and Syria in having a 
natural population growth rate of over 2 percent per annum, in sharp contrast to countries with rapidly 
decreasing fertility rates (namely the GCC states, Tunisia and Morocco).
4   Defined as the ratio of working age adults over young and old dependents.
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with the literature in section one, that demographic transition, especially when combined 
with economic reforms, can make a significant contribution to per capita economic growth. 
Having quantified both the short-term financial costs and long-term economic opportu-
nity costs of population momentum, section five explores how neighbouring countries, 
especially Egypt and Iran, have sought to mitigate population growth through support for 
reproductive rights, and the extent to which these policies could be replicated in Iraq. The 
final section concludes with a review of the evidence and possible next steps.
1. The Link Between Demography and Economic Development
The link between a country’s demographic structure and economic development is well-es-
tablished.5 Specifically, the empirical literature suggests that countries that are experiencing 
a decrease in their age dependency ratio, can reap a demographic dividend6 associated with the 
fact that a larger proportion of the population is of working age and engaged in productive 
endeavours. However, this demographic dividend is conditional on  certain socio-economic 
conditions having been met. Specifically, countries need to have an economic and business 
environment that can employ the working age population in productive activities.7 
There are several identified mechanisms through which a changing population structure 
can generate a ‘demographic dividend’.8 Specifically, an increase in the proportion of the 
population who are of working age generates three key effects. The first is an increase in the 
labour supply, especially of women, who are more likely to be able to join the workforce if 
they have fewer children. Secondly, an increase in savings: unlike the young and old who 
tend to consume more than they save, the working age population tend to save more than 
they consume. This means that the availability of funding for capital investment increases. 
Finally, there may be increased investment in education, as smaller families result in more 
per capita expenditure in the future prospects of their children. The interaction of the 
demographic transition with the economic environment can therefore yield a huge devel-
opmental dividend. Bloom, Canning and Sevilla estimate that one-fourth to two-fifths of 
the East Asian economic miracle was due to the change in demography coupled with an 
economic model able to scale up export-oriented, labour-intensive industries.9 
5   David Bloom, David Canning and JP Sevilla, The Demographic Dividend: A New Perspective on the Eco-
nomic Consequences of Population Change (Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 2006); David Canning, 
Sangeeta Raja and Abdo S. Yazbeck, ‘The Economic Effects of the Demographic Dividend,’ in David 
Canning, Sangeeta Raja and Abdo S. Yazbeck (eds), Africa’s Demographic Transition: Dividend or Disaster? 
(Washington DC: The World Bank, 2015); David Canning and T. Paul Schultz, ‘The Economic Conse-
quences of Reproductive Health and Family Planning’, The Lancet 380 (2012), pp. 165–71.
6   Formally defined as: ‘the economic growth potential that can result from shifts in a population’s age 
structure, mainly when the share of the working-age population (15 to 64) is larger than the non-work-
ing-age share of the population (14 and younger, and 65 and older).’ See ‘The Demographic Transition’, 
UNFPA (2020).
7   David Bloom, David Canning and JP Sevilla, ‘Economic Growth and the Demographic Transition’, 
National Bureau of Economic Research Working Paper Series no. 8685 (2001), pp. 1–87. 
8   Ibid., pp. 21–4.
9   Ibid.
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Is Iraq Placed to Benefit from a Demographic Dividend?
Whether or not a country can benefit from the demographic dividend depends on whether 
its economy can allocate the increased number of working age people into productive 
employment. Unfortunately, even before the effects of COVID-19,10 Iraq’s economic poli-
cies made this unlikely. As the most important function of economic decision-making in 
the country is to placate clientelist networks of political incumbents rather than support 
long-term economic growth.11
Specifically, Iraq’s labour market is dominated by oil revenue dependent jobs in the public 
sector and informal small firms in the private sector. The capital-intensive oil sector gen-
erates less than 1 percent of employment.12 Public sector employment has grown from 
less than 800,000 in 2003 to 3 to 7 million by 2017 but is generated via oil revenue, as Iraq 
lacks a broad tax base.13 Furthermore, non-state formal employment is limited as Iraq’s 
hostile business environment, marred by corruption, political instability and inconsistent 
regulation, deters the creation of formal firms and the development of potentially labour 
intensive agricultural and tourism sectors.14 Therefore, as the below sections will explore 
in more detail, the growing youth bulge in Iraq coupled with a sclerotic economic model 
means that the country’s ability to generate a demographic dividend, in the absence of 
significant policy change, is very limited. 
Paradoxically, the collapse in oil prices induced at the time of writing by COVID-19, make 
the returns of the demographic dividend higher. This is because the budget deficit is set 
to increase to possibly 30 percent of GDP in 2020.15 Therefore, supporting demographic 
transition would deliver relief, as the per capita fall in public expenditure would be more 
limited than would otherwise be the case. As public sector spending is used to ‘buy social 
peace’ in Iraq, supporting demographic transition could potentially generate significant 
‘security’ externalities, reducing the risk of violence.
10   At the time of writing (Spring 2020) the full economic, social, and political effects of COVID-19 are yet 
to fully manifest. However, as much of the analysis at hand is about the marginal impact of a change in 
population growth given an existing economic baseline, the analysis is likely to remain useful even if the 
baseline economic context is radically different. If anything, by making the imperative for economic and 
labour market reforms more essential, due to much lower oil prices, this paper is likely to understate the 
effect of rapid population growth in Iraq.
11   Alexander Hamilton, ‘The Political Economy of Economic Policy in Iraq’, LSE Middle East Centre Paper 
Series 32 (2020).
12   World Bank, ‘Iraq: Systematic Country Diagnostic’, World Bank (2017). Available at: http://documents.
worldbank.org/curated/en/542811487277729890/Iraq-Systematic-Country-Diagnostic (accessed 22 Sep-
tember 2020).
13   Ibid.
14   World Bank, Doing Business 2019: Training for Reform (Washington, DC: World Bank, 2019).
15   Wael Mansour, Ashwaq Natiq Maseeh, Bledi Celiku, Alexandre Hugo Laure, Marolla Haddad and Zoe 
Cordelia Lu, Iraq Economic Monitor: Navigating the Perfect Storm (Redux) (Washington, DC: World Bank 
Group, 2020). Available at: http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/446201588465646751/Iraq-Eco-
nomic-Monitor-Navigating-the-Perfect-Storm-Redux (accessed 22 September 2020).
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2. Iraq’s Unique Demography16
Before analysing the economic consequences of Iraq’s demography, it is useful to examine 
the comparative trajectory of its  population growth vis-a-vis the MENA region. This not 
only allows us to identify the absolute changes in population, but also how they compare 
to neighbouring countries. Thereby helping us to identify the magnitude of the potential 
financial and economic consequences of Iraq’s demographic profile.
Figure 1 below shows annual population growth rates in Iraq, Iran and the MENA regional 
average. Population growth has fallen since 1960 across the region, with average growth 
rate in the MENA going from 2.8% in 1962 to 1.7% in 2018. However, this broad trend masks 
significant temporal and cross-country variation in population growth rates. While Iraq 
actually started the period with a population growth rate just below the MENA average 
(2.6% vs. 2.8%), this quickly changed; and, with the exception of the years in which the 
Iran-Iraq war raged (1980–8), Iraq has had a population growth rate that is only margin-
ally below what it was in 1960 (2.3% in 2018 vs. 2.6% in 1960) and significantly above the 
MENA average (1.7% by 2018). This Iraqi ‘exceptionalism’ is even more dramatic in rela-
tion to neighbouring Iran, which had a population growth rate above that of Iraq in 1960 
(2.7%) but which had fallen to 1.4% by 2018. 
Figure 1: Population Growth (%) by Country
Source: World Bank17
16   While the data used in this section comes from the World Bank, it is important to note that it relies on 
underlying datasets collected at the national level by a variety of actors. Given the difficulty in collecting 
reliable data in Iraq, and the absence of a proper census (the last partial census was held in 1997), the 
specific details, although not the broad trends, need to be treated with some caution. 
17   World Bank Data for Development, World Bank (2019). Available at: https://data.worldbank.org/ 
(accessed 22 September 2020).
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While annual population growth rate can tell us what is happening to the population 
structure today, fertility rates18 can give us an indication of the future trajectory of popu-
lation growth. Unsurprisingly, there is a clear association between past fertility rate and 
population growth patterns. As Figure 2 below shows, in 1960 Iraq’s fertility rate of 6.2 
births per woman was slightly lower than that of the MENA or Iran (both 7). However, 
by 2016, significant divergence between fertility rates had occurred. Iran’s fertility rate, 
at 1.8 in 2016 was lower than the UK’s (1.9) and below the high-income replacement rate 
fertility (RRF) of 2.1.19 The MENA average fertility rate is 2.8  and Iraq’s rate of 3.7 is closer 
to the sub-Saharan average of 4.3 than its MENA peers. In fact, Iraq has one of the highest 
fertility rates in the MENA region.20
Figure 2: Fertility Rate by Country
Source: World Bank21
The implications of Iraq’s current and expected future fertility rate can be seen in Figure 
3 below. The United Nations Population Fund’s (UNFPA) median population projection 
suggests that, on the current trajectory, Iraq’s population of 40 million in 2020 will reach 
approximately 108 million by 2100. 
18   Defined as the number of children a woman of childbearing age is expected to have. 
19   The replacement fertility rate in high-income countries (with low infant mortality) is 2.1 Meaning 
that if this is the fertility rate then, net of migration, the population will remain constant (not grow or 
shrink). In developing contexts like Iraq, the replacement fertility rate is higher than 2.1 owning to var-
iations in infant mortality.
20   Only Yemen and Gaza, with a fertility rate of 4.1 and 4.0 respectively, have a comparable fertility rate 
to Iraq.
21   World Bank Data for Development (2019).
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Figure 3: Iraq Median Population Projection (m)
Source: World Bank22
However, despite its significant population growth, as Figure 4 below shows, Iraq has 
begun its demographic transition, marked by a declining age dependency ratio. As the fer-
tility rate has fallen, the proportion of working age adults has increased relative to young 
dependents while the proportion of old age dependents remains low. Linked with the 
gradual decline in fertility, Iraq’s dependency ratio, which peaked at 104 in 1979,23 had 
gradually declined to 71 by 2018 as the fall in young dependents offset any increase in old 
age cohorts. Of course, given Iraq’s relatively slow demographic transition, the decline 
in the dependency ratio has been less dramatic vis-à-vis the MENA average, which went 
from 89 in 1960 to 55 in 2018 or Iran’s which went from 88 in 1960 to 44 in 2018. 
22   Ibid.
23   Meaning there were 104 dependents for every 100 people of working age. 
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Figure 4: Age Dependency Structure Across MENA
Source: World Bank24
In short, Iraq in 2018 had a demographic momentum that is atypical of the MENA region. 
Still, the decline in the fertility rate has resulted in a change in the age dependency ratio. 
Whether or not Iraq can turn this demographic transition into an advantage, or whether 
this results in economic and political upheaval, depends on the economic policy and 
reproductive health decisions it makes.
Can Iraq take Advantage of its Demographic Dividend?
The consensus in the economic literature is that, in order for a country to take advan-
tage of the rise in the proportion of the working-age population, the economy must be 
able to utilise this growing resource by allocating it to productive use.25 In many East 
Asian states, the rise in the working age population coincided with an economic context 
in which labour-intensive export industries could absorb this extra labour and use it to 
significantly grow the manufacturing export base.
Unfortunately, as noted in section one, even before the impact of COVID-19, Iraq’s 
economy is not well placed to absorb the growing numbers of entrants into the labour 
market every year.26 This is because, with the exception of the capital-intensive oil sector, 
most formal employment in Iraq is through the public sector. The country’s private sector 
consists of mostly small informal businesses exhibiting low productivity. Furthermore, 
there has been little investment in human capital development through skills and educa-
tion training. In fact, the very difficult business environment (Iraq is ranked 171 out of 190 
in the World Bank’s Ease of Doing Business Index27) means that the availability of jobs for 
this growing population are likely to remain limited in the absence of radical economic 
24   World Bank Data for Development (2019).
25   Bloom, Canning and Sevilla, ‘Economic Growth and the Demographic Transition’, p. 14.
26   World Bank, ‘Iraq: Systematic Country Diagnostic’ (2017).
27   World Bank, Doing Business 2019: Training for Reform.
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change. The limited opportunities for Iraqi youth can also be seen by the poor returns to 
education.28 Generally, labour markets that provide opportunities for skilled graduates 
have higher returns to education than those that do not. Given that most formal employ-
ment in Iraq is driven by the clientelist distribution of jobs in the public sector and that 
the small-scale informal sector invests little in research and development, it is not surpris-
ing that Iraq has one of the lowest returns to education in the world.29 
At the time of writing, the impact of COVID-19-induced recession is also likely to limit 
the ability of any demographic transition to foster better economic outcomes because the 
private sector in Iraq is under quarantine. However, as noted in section one and expounded 
on in section four, the per capita fiscal effect of reducing demographic momentum could 
significantly bolster real spending on social services even as the huge budget deficit forces 
spending cuts. 
3. Forecasting the Impact of Population Growth on Iraq’s 
Public Finances
While all forecasting exercises need to be treated with caution, especially given the diffi-
culty in modelling the effects of the  COVID-19 crisis at the time of writing, exploring the 
short-term link between different population projections and their fiscal consequences 
is made more plausible by the fact that 40 percent of GDP and 91 percent of government 
revenue in Iraq is derived from oil production,30 which is highly insensitive to short-term 
variations in population growth.31 As such, a simple accounting exercise that explores how 
marginal variations in population growth affect the economy and public finances is not 
without merit. This is especially pertinent because Iraq’s status as a fragile state means 
that  short-term economic shocks, such as the impact of marginally faster than expected 
population growth, could have significant effects on the economy, social welfare and even 
socio-political stability. This exercise is complemented, in section four, by an examination 
of the more dynamic consequences of demographic change on the broader economy.
Independent Variable of Interest: Population Projections
In order to identify realistic variations in Iraq’s population growth, we use the 2019 UN 
28   That is the financial returns of additional years of schooling/attending higher education. George 
Psacharopoulos and Harry Anthony Patrinos, ‘Returns to Investment in Education: A Decennial Review 
of the Global Literature’, World Bank Policy Research Working Paper no. 8402 (2018). Available at: http://
documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/442521523465644318/Returns-to-investment-in-education-a-de-
cennial-review-of-the-global-literature (accessed 23 September 2020).
29   Ibid.
30   ‘World Economic Outlook’, IMF (2019). Available at: https://www.imf.org/en/Publications/SPROLLS/
world-economic-outlook-databases#sort=%40imfdate%20descending (accessed 23 September 2020).
31   It is entirely plausible that, in the long-run, continued population growth could result in government 
efforts to increase oil production. However, at the time of writing, there is scant evidence of significant 
changes in such investment in the coming years, with oil exploration, gas capture, and other related 
investments remaining sluggish over the last few years. Ibid.
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estimations for population growth between 2020–4.32 Accurate population projections are 
notoriously difficult to make. However, the UN, estimates mitigate against this by provid-
ing low, median, and, high variants of population change (Table 1, below). This allows our 
analysis to look at a plausible range of population parameters, and how changes between 
the different forecasts might impact on a given forecasted oil revenue.
Table 1: Iraq Population Projections
Population Projection (m) 2020 2021 2022 2023 2024
High variant 40.22 41.27 42.33 43.41 44.50
Medium variant 40.22 41.18 42.17 43.17 44.18
Low variant 40.22 41.17 42.10 43.00 43.89
Source: UN Population Division (2019)
Dependent Variable of Interest I: Economic Growth Forecasts of Iraq
We use the IMF’s 2019 forecast for GDP growth to 2024 as one of our dependent variables 
of interest (Figure 5).33 While this forecast does not consider the effects of COVID-19 on the 
economy generally,  and oil production specifically, it still offers a plausible, if somewhat 
optimistic, trajectory for Iraq’s future.34 If anything, as the COVID-19 pandemic is likely to 
make the Iraqi economy more fragile, it is likely to mean that our analysis underestimates 
the costs of marginal population growth in Iraq vis-à-vis a baseline forecast that included 
the effects of COVID-19. This is because the size of oil rents to the total population will 
be sufficiently diminished, making the per capita distribution of rents, for any given pop-
ulation level, less generous than initially expected.35 As plausible economic forecasts can 
only be made for a relatively short period of time, we restrict ourselves to projections up 
to 2024 (at which point the detailed IMF estimates end). The IMF forecast makes some 
specific assumptions regarding Iraq’s medium-term economic trajectory. Specifically, the 
IMF forecast assumes that oil production in Iraq increases substantially – from 4.4 million 
barrels per day (m.b.p.d.) in 2018 to 5.18 m.b.p.d. (18 percent increase); although it also 
assumes that the price of Iraqi oil exports decreases by $10 per barrel (from $65.2 to $55.4). 
We can also decompose GDP per capita into its oil dependent (population invariant) and 
non-oil dependent (more sensitive to population growth) sub-components. 
32   Details for all the variables used in this section can be found in Table 11, Annex A.
33   This analysis does not account for the impact of COVID-19 on the global economy (evolving at the 
time of writing). However, it hopefully represents a reasonable ‘average’ overall projection over the 
entire time period.
34   While not considered in the analysis below, Iraq’s compliance with the OPEC++ deal for 2020 and 
2021 would mean about a 17% reduction in production in each of these years, while Iraq oil prices, at 
least in 2020/21 would decrease by up $30 per barrel in 2020 and up $20 per barrel  in 2021. As our anal-
ysis explores the qualitative change in per capita expenditure given a prior level of oil revenues this does 
not change the thrust of our findings. Although, the absolute magnitude of this effect will vary by the size 
of oil rents available. We choose not to include the impact of OPEC++ cuts in production because Iraq 
has historically failed to honour these, and it is unlikely that this will change in the future.
35   In its 2020 ‘World Economic Outlook’, the IMF has downgraded Iraq’s economic growth and reve-
nues from oil. Forecasting a possible budget deficit equal to 20–30% of GDP and the doubling of poverty 
from 20% to 40% of households.  
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Figure 5: Iraqi GDP per Capita
Source: IMF (2019)
Dependent Variables of Interest II: Fiscal Revenues
Figure 6 shows Iraqi government revenues per capita, once again decomposed into oil and 
non-oil revenues given the IMF’s estimation. Unsurprisingly, the vast majority of govern-
ment revenue in Iraq are from oil revenues, with 91 percent in 2020 and 89 percent by 2024.
Figure 6: Iraqi Government Revenues per Capita
Source: IMF (2019)
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Results
Table 2 below shows the effect of shifting between Iraq’s UN high/median/low population 
projection for 2020–4 on GDP per capita. The cumulative effect of a shift from the median 
to the high population projection is a per-capita income that is 0.72 percent less than it 
would be if the median population projection was maintained.
Table 2: Iraqi GDP per Capita and Population Shifts
Constant USD 2020 2021 2022 2023 2024
High variant $6,017 $6,159 $6,302 $6,450 $6,618
Medium variant $6,017 $6,172 $6,326 $6,486 $6,666
Low variant $6,017 $6,173 $6,336 $6,511 $6,710
Shift from medium to high 
variant
-$13 -$24 -$36 -$48
Shift from medium to high 
variant (% of GDP)
-0.21 -0.37 -0.56 -0.72
Source: author’s own calculations.
Of course, Table 2 assumes that per capita GDP is unaffected by marginal changes in 
population growth (an unrealistic assumption). This is unlikely to be true for the non-oil 
component of GDP but is not an unrealistic assumption (in the short run) for the oil-gen-
erated component of GDP. Table 3 therefore repeats the analysis but focuses only on the 
impact of marginal population change on the oil-generated element of GDP, which gener-
ates the same proportional effect.
Table 3: Iraqi (Oil-Generated) GDP per Capita and Population Shifts
Constant USD 2020 2021 2022 2023 2024
High variant $3,652 $3,856 $4,045 $4,213 $4,393
Medium variant $3,652 $3,865 $4,061 $4,237 $4,425
Low variant $3,652 $3,866 $4,068 $4,254 $4,454
Shift from medium to high 
variant
-$9 -$16 -$24 -$32
Shift from medium to high 
variant (% of GDP)
-0.21 -0.37 -0.56 -0.72
Source: author’s own calculations.
Given the almost complete dependence of government spending on (population insensi-
tive) oil revenues, we can (realistically) model the effect of changes in marginal population 
growth on government expenditure per capita. As Table 4 below indicates, the cumulative 
net effect of a shift from the median to the high population projection has a very similar 
effect on public expenditure per capita as with GDP per capita; with public expenditure 
being 0.72 percent smaller by 2024 due to population growth, equivalent to $2.9bn worth 
of government spending.
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Table 4: Iraqi per Capita Public Expenditure
Constant USD 2020 2021 2022 2023 2024
High variant $2,383 $2,334 $2,300 $2,290 $2,283
Medium variant $2,383 $2,339 $2,309 $2,303 $2,300
Low variant $2,383 $2,340 $2,313 $2,312 $2,315
Shift from medium to high 
variant (% of spend)
-0.22 -0.38 -0.55 -0.72
Source: author’s own calculations.
The potential magnitude of these figures can more intuitively be understood by focusing 
on the impact on specific sectors. If we assume that the proportion of expenditure to 
GDP devoted to each sector remains constant until 2024,36 and the entire fiscal adjust-
ment of shifting from the median to the high population growth projection falls on just 
one sector, then this marginal change in population is equivalent to a cumulative per 
capita cut in expenditures on health of 7%, or defence 9%, or official development assis-
tance (ODA) of 17%.
Table 5 shows that a shift from the median to the high population projection would result 
in a 7 percent cut in per capita health expenditure if the whole cost of the population 
adjustment fell on the healthcare budget. Given that Iraq already has one of the lowest life 
expectancies in the region, hospitals require significant reconstruction funds, and there 
is significant leakage due to corruption, a real cut in public expenditures at a time of 
increased needs would represent a significant challenge for improving healthcare systems.
Table 5: Health Spending per Capita and Demography
Constant USD 2020 2024 % Change
Medium variant $214 $237 ~
High variant $214 $220 -7
Source: author’s own calculations.
Table 6 shows what would happen if the entire fiscal effect of the population adjustment 
occurred to the military budget – a 9 percent fall in per capita expenditure. Given Iraq’s 
fragility, including the risk of terrorism, such a decline could be significant and result in 
increased violence and instability. However, it is difficult to gauge the extent to which 
funds allocated to defence affect defence capacity, rather than simply support clientelist 
militia and civilian networks. 
36   Of course, the budgets for different sectors such as health, education and defence can fluctuate widely 
year-on-year – especially given changed in oil prices. However, these are not particularly affected by pop-
ulation growth, which has slowly declined in recent years as actual budgets have fluctuated significantly. 
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Table 6: Defence Spending per Capita and Demography
Constant USD 2020 2024 % Change
Medium variant $162 $179 ~
High variant $162 $162 -9
Source: author’s own calculations.
Finally, although not part of the Iraqi budget, and possibly more sensitive to changes in 
population growth, if ODA flows remained constant as a percent of GDP, then population 
momentum could result in the equivalent of a 17 percent fall in per capita ODA flows. 
Given that a large proportion of ODA in Iraq is focused on supporting displaced persons 
and vulnerable communities, the effect of even much lower per capita changes could be 
quite significant.
Table 7: ODA Spending per Capita and Demography
Constant USD 2020 2024 % Change
Medium variant $88.4 $98 ~
Medium to high variant $88.4 $81 -17
Source: author’s own calculations.
The analysis in this section suggests that the potential fiscal impact of even minor changes 
in population growth can be quite large. Of course, the analysis assumes that there is 
limited change in behaviour following marginal changes in population growth. This 
assumption is not unrealistic when it comes to government expenditure in the short-run, 
given the dependence of government on oil revenue. However, as the literature in section 
one indicates, the dynamic effects of population change can be significant. It is possible 
that the static analysis above might be overestimating the effect of population momen-
tum, because governments or other actors may strategically react to mitigate the effects 
of increased population growth and/or take advantage of the demographic dividend to 
increase the growth rate. Given these concerns, the next section explores the dynamic 
consequences of population growth. 
4. The Economic Consequences of Demographic Change: 
Evidence from across the MENA Region
The previous section focused on using forecasts of short-term population growth to 
examine the fiscal effects effects of demographic change. Such static analysis is inher-
ently limited as it cannot fully capture the dynamic effects of demographic change on the 
economy and/or how actors, such as governments, households, and/or individuals may 
react to augment the benefits and/or mitigate the costs of demographic change. There-
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fore, exploring the impact of population change over time in the MENA region can help 
us identify what the net effect of changes in population structure may be for Iraq. Spe-
cifically, we can use data on demographic change in Iraq and neighbouring countries to 
explore how a shift in demographic transition due to a lower age dependency ratio can 
impact on per capita economic growth. We can utilise  an identification strategy similar to 
those used in existing literature to identify this relationship. Thereby, we can complement 
the analysis regarding the static fiscal costs of Iraq’s demography with their dynamic eco-
nomic opportunity cost as well.
Dependent Variable
Our dependent variable of interest is the log of GDP per capita in purchasing power parity 
USD.37 Despite its limitations, GDP remains the single most reliable indicator of economic 
activity. Ideally, it would have been useful to complement the analysis using a measure of 
poverty headcount, as such a variable would capture the effect of demographic momen-
tum on inclusive economic growth. This may be especially pertinent as there are good and 
intuitive reasons to expect that rapid population momentum may more severely impact 
lower income households. However, the paucity of data, with many MENA countries only 
having poverty headcounts once per decade, limit the feasibility of using this approach.
Independent Variables of Interest
The first independent variable of interest is the age dependency ratio. That is the ratio 
of dependents, young and old, to the working age population (ages 16–64). As noted in 
section two, most MENA countries are slowly experiencing a demographic transition in 
which the proportion of dependents is falling as birth rates decline, but there is still not a 
large portion of old age dependents. Theory and evidence suggests that there should be a 
negative association between an increase in the number of dependents and GDP per capita. 
Therefore, a demographic transition in which a falling birth rate reduces the dependency 
ratio faster than ageing increases it should be associated with higher per capita income (if 
the literature in Section 1 is correct).
However, while the age structure has been shown to affect economic growth, the literature 
suggests its impact may be conditional on the broader microeconomy – that is, on the 
ability of the private sector to generate jobs for the working-age population. In the worst-
case scenario, a falling dependency ratio may yield limited economic benefits if there is 
no ability to absorb working-age adults into productive employment. Therefore, a second 
independent variable of interest is a sub-indicator of the World Bank’s ‘Ease of Doing Busi-
ness Index’, which quantifies the costs of setting up and running a small and medium-sized 
enterprise (SME) for both married men and women (see Annex A for details). While, like 
GDP per capita, this indicator is likely to only capture elements of the microeconomic envi-
ronment, it provides a reasonable proxy for salient economic conditions for a significant 
period of time across MENA countries. In order to explore the hypothetical conditionality 
37   See Table 12 in Annex A for details on all the variables used in this section.
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between the microeconomy and population structures, we also interact the doing business 
indicator with the age dependency ratio. As theory suggests that a decrease in both indica-
tors would be associated with more economic growth. In other words, a larger proportion 
of working age adults and fewer regulatory costs associated with opening and running a 
business would result in higher economic growth. Therefore, we would expect the interac-
tion term between the two variables to be negatively associated with GDP per capita.
Control Variables and Robustness Checks
Other determinants of GDP per capita are also included in the analysis. Time and country 
fixed effects are used throughout – thereby controlling for such critical variables as the 
price of Brent Crude (time-fixed effect) and non-time variant attributes of countries. Due 
to the paucity of data in the MENA region, time-country varying variables are included, 
but there is an acute trade-off as the lack of data in at least one MENA country signifi-
cantly reduces the sample size. In order to include as many of these variables as possible, 
and also test the robustness of the model specifications, two separate clusters of such 
control variables are included. ‘Basic Controls’ includes absolutely essential controls 
that are theorised to significantly affect GDP per capita in MENA. This includes: natural 
resource rents as a % of GDP – essential given the large oil and natural gas deposits in 
some of the countries; Overseas Development Assistance (% of GDP) – a proxy for soci-
oeconomic development; and government expenditure (as a % of GDP) – a proxy of state 
capacity and direct contributor to GDP. As a robustness check we also run some models 
using a vector of ‘Additional Control’ variables in order to test the sensitivity of results. 
‘Additional Controls’ include exports (% of GDP); Fragile State Index score; foreign direct 
investment (% of GDP); Polity Regime score; unemployment (%); and urbanisation (%).38 
We also use a sex disaggregated version of the Doing Business independent variable of 
interest to explore whether the effects are different for men and women.
Model Specification 
For the time series panel format, our specification can be written as:
(1.01)
Where  is the log of per capita income at purchasing power parity in country i and 
time period t;  is the age dependency ratio in country i and time period t;  is the ease of 
doing business score in country i and time period t;  is a vector of country-year control 
variables;  is a time fixed effect; and  is a country fixed effect. 
38   Other desirable controls, like investment (% of GDP), education spending and literacy could not be 
included because of the extreme paucity of data in a significant subset of MENA countries. 
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Results
Table 8 overleaf reports the results of our regression analysis. As anticipated by prior 
research, the age dependency ratio is negatively and robustly associated with a significant 
change in GDP per capita. Model 1 shows that a one unit increase in the dependency ratio 
is associated with a statistically significant decrease in per capita income of 1.2%. Model 2 
shows that a one unit increase in costs associated with starting and operating a business 
are associated with a statistically significant 0.2% decrease in per capita income. Model III 
brings together the age dependency ratio and the ease of doing business. The interaction 
effect between the two variables is negatively and statistically significantly associated with 
lower per capita income (a one unit increase in the interaction effect is associated with a 
0.01% decrease in per capita income). This means that countries which invest in reducing 
the age dependency ratio and reducing the cost of doing business will have higher per 
capita income vis-à-vis countries that do neither, or only focus on one or the other. Inter-
estingly, when including the interaction term (Model III-V), (1) the independent effect of 
the age dependency ratio remains robust and significant throughout (a one unit increase in 
the age dependency ratio is associated with a 1.6% decrease in per capita income – Model 
III), but (2) the independent effect of the Doing Business Index is no longer significant; 
suggesting that (3) in MENA countries the effects of economic reforms may be conditional 
on demographic transition – as the interaction variable between the age dependency ratio 
and the cost of doing business always remains significant (with a joint one unit increase 
in the age dependency ratio and the cost of doing business bring per capita GDP down 
by 0.01% above and beyond the independent effect of the age dependency ratio). Model 
IV is the same as Model III but includes the additional vector of controls. The fact that 
the results are similar to the results in Model III – both the independent effect of the age 
dependency ratio and the interaction effect of the age dependency ratio and the cost for 
doing business remain highly significant – is reassuring, as this suggests that the results 
are not being driven by omitted variable bias. Finally, Model V is identical to Model IV, 
except that it uses the costs of opening and operating a business by a woman (instead of 
a man). This change in variables does not alter the results, which suggests that the age 
dependency ratio and the interaction of the age dependency ratio and the cost of opening 
and running a business are robustly associated with changes in per capita income.
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Table 8: The Relationship Between Economic Reforms and Dependency Ratio
Independent Variable
Dependent Variable: (Log) Per Capita Income
Model I Model II Model III Model IV Model V
Interaction Effect -5.15e-05
(2.53e-05)**
-6.13e-05
(2.58e-05)**
-6.13e-05
(2.58e-05)**
Age Dependency Ratio -0.012
(0.00070)***
-1.59e-02
(2.56e-03)***
-1.17e-02
(3.42e-03)***
-1.17e-02
(3.42e-03)***
Ease of Doing Business -0.0019
(0.00037)***
2.33e-03
(1.75e-03)
2.60e-03
(1.89e-03)
2.60e-03
(1.89e-03)
Basic Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Additional Controls No No No Yes Yes
Country Fixed Events Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Time Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Sample Size 576 149 149 139 139
Adjusted R2 0.38 0.27 0.47 0.54 0.54
***, denotes significance at the 1% level, ** denotes significance at the 5% level, * denotes significance at the 10% level.
These regression results complement the analysis in the previous section that documented 
how changes in population growth affect per capita public expenditures. Essentially, what 
the results above show is that there is potentially a significant and dynamic opportu-
nity cost of Iraq failing to speed up its demographic transition and thereby decreasing its 
dependency ratio. As such, not only does rapid population growth threaten the quality of 
public service provision, but possibly through lower levels of investment in human capital, 
also results in long-term economic opportunity costs. Of course, given the data limita-
tions, we need to treat our results with a certain level of caution. The poor data quality in 
MENA countries limits the number of variables and techniques (including instrumental 
variables) that have been used in our analysis. Therefore, issues of omitted variable bias, 
and reverse causality cannot be precluded. However, given that the results for the MENA 
region are consistent with the results of other empirical studies (that use larger datasets 
from more regions and more sophisticated econometric techniques to test causality39), at 
least suggests that there is no reason to believe that the MENA region in general, and Iraq 
specifically, could not improve economic growth by fostering its demographic transition. 
39   For example, Bloom et al. (2001) uses rainfall as an instrumental variable for per capita income when 
looking at sub-Saharan African countries to establish the link between changes in the age dependency 
ratio and per capita income: Bloom, Canning and Sevilla, ‘Economic Growth and the Demographic 
Transition’.
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5. Policy Lessons from the MENA Region
The financial and economic consequences of population dynamics documented above 
suggest that it is important to explore how demographic transition can be supported in 
Iraq. Given that demographic transition can be  instigated by falls in fertility rates (that 
reduce the inflow of young dependents while there are still few old dependents), it is 
worth focusing on what interventions have worked to facilitate changes in the total fer-
tility rate (TFR) in the MENA region. As noted in section two, despite experiencing a fall 
in average fertility rates, the MENA region continues to have one of the fastest natural 
population growth rates in the world. However, the region, like virtually all others, has 
experienced a significant drop in the natural population growth rate. This has been partly 
driven by the increased adoption of rights-based support for voluntary family planning 
interventions across the region. The success of such strategies varies significantly. For 
example, Iran have managed to achieve a rapid and sustained fall in fertility rates and 
corresponding changes in the age dependency ratio by adopting a comprehensive rights-
based voluntary family planning strategy. Conversely, other countries such as Egypt have 
failed to achieve the same results despite political support and a concerted effort to invest 
in voluntary family planning and reproductive rights. 
There is evidence that increasing voluntary access to modern contraceptives, measured 
by the modern contraception prevalence rate (MCPR), has a significant effect on fertil-
ity rates. Specifically, as Figure 7 below illustrates, increase in the MCPR in one year is 
associated with a significant decrease in fertility rates in the subsequent year across the 
MENA region.40 Of course, as noted in section two, there is significant variation in the 
extent to which different sets of interventions appear to be associated with declines in 
fertility rates. In fact, as a large literature has demonstrated, the effectiveness of different 
voluntary family planning methods can vary significantly, and, if not properly designed 
and calibrated to the specific country context, could prove ineffective.41
Furthermore, as the empirical analysis above indicates, the effects of supporting voluntary 
family planning depends significantly on other factors, such as the ability of the economy 
to provide employment opportunities for the working age population. Given Iraq’s hostile 
business environment, it is plausible that augmenting Iraq’s demographic transition 
would not lead to rapid economic growth in the absence of economic reforms. However, 
given Iraq’s extreme dependence on oil revenues to finance public service provision and 
human capital investment, the fiscal impact of supporting demographic transition could 
be atypically large (see section four). Therefore, despite the challenges of implementing 
40   A tobit regression between the contraception prevalence rate and the (1-year lagged) fertility rate 
found a very strong association between increases in the contraception rate and lagged falls in fertility. 
A 10 percentage-point increase in the MCPR was associated with an 0.72 decrease in the total fertility 
rate and highly significant well beyond the 1% confidence interval (t-value of  -12.09), and a pseudo-R2 
of 0.22. The relationship becomes even stronger when country fixed effects are added  (-0.97), remains 
highly significant at the 1% level and the overall model fit is even better (pseudo-R2 of 0.51) .
41   Anushka Ataullahjan, Zubia Mumtaz and Helen Vallianatos, ‘Family planning in Pakistan: A site of 
resistance’, Social Science and Medicine 230 (June 2019), pp. 158–65.
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successful voluntary family  planning programmes in developing countries, and Iraq’s spe-
cific stability and economic challenges, the potential fiscal returns of investing in these 
interventions is potentially very high.
Figure 7: Modern Contraception Prevalence and Fertility in MENA
Source: Author’s calculation using UN and WB data.
In order to better understand what interventions may be effective in Iraq, it is useful to 
explore lessons from two other neighbouring states that have sought to reduce population 
growth through voluntary family planning in recent years. Specifically, we look at the very 
successful case of neighbouring Iran, and the less successful case of Egypt.
Iran42
In 1986 Iran and Iraq had a comparable fertility rate of approximately 6.0 children per 
woman, with both countries being above the MENA average of having 5.6 children per 
women. By 2016, the two countries had diverged considerably. Iran now has one of 
the lowest fertility rates in the region at 2.01 ( just below the high-income replacement 
rate fertility of 2.1) and considerably below the MENA average of 2.8. Iraq’s fertility 
rate on the other hand is 3.7, and although declining it nevertheless remains consider-
ably above the regional average. A big driver of this policy divergence has been Iran’s 
42   This case study is adapted from Laura Bolton, ‘Family Planning Lessons with a Focus on MENA Coun-
tries’, K4D Helpdesk Report 688 (Brighton: Institute of Development Studies, 2019).
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policy response to the 1986 census which, by highlighting Iran’s population momentum, 
spurred policy change. In 1989, Iran’s pro-natalist policies were reversed and the gov-
ernment pursued a multi-pronged policy aimed at supporting demographic transition. 
This included the following objectives:
• Spacing of births between children of 3–4 years;
• Discouraging teenage and geriatric pregnancies;
• Limiting families to 2–3 children;
The regime sought to realise these goals by:
• Free contraceptives for married couples;
• The provision of high quality and multi-type contraceptive methods across the coun-
try (including in historically underserved rural areas);
• The development of social protection systems (mainly pensions), aimed at reducing 
the need to have children as security in old age;
• A media and education information campaign, which was also endorsed by religious 
leaders;
• Active monitoring and research of family planning policy and implementation in or-
der to improve effectiveness;
• A coordination mechanism (from 1990 the Birth Limitation Council) aimed at ensur-
ing coherent policy across implementing agencies. 
Results of the programme included an increase in contraception use from 49 percent in 
1989 to 76 percent in 1997.43 While the fertility rate is influenced by multiple different 
factors, not least socio-economic development, the fact that Iran’s fertility rate fell so 
much and so much faster than many of its peers in the region (that had experienced 
faster per-capita economic growth) suggests that Iran’s coherent and multi-faceted 
approach to voluntary family planning is likely to have made a significant contribution 
to its demographic transition.
Egypt44
Egypt begun investing heavily in voluntary family planning at the end of the twentieth 
century. By 2012 it had one of the highest contraceptive use rates in the MENA region 
(over 60 percent45), and over 95 percent of the population lived within 5 kilometres of a 
43   Masoumeh Simbar, ‘Achievements of the Iranian family planning programmes 1956–2006’, Eastern 
Mediterranean Health Journal 18/3 (2012), cited in Bolton, ‘Family Planning Lessons with a Focus on 
MENA Countries’.
44   This case study is adapted from Bolton, ‘Family Planning Lessons with a Focus on MENA Countries’.
45   UNFPA, ‘Family Planning: Demographic Household Survey Brochures’, UNFPA Egypt (2010), cited in 
Bolton, ‘Family Planning Lessons with a Focus on MENA Countries’.
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health clinic.46 Despite this extensive coverage the fertility rate increased between 2008 
and 2014, rising from 3.0 to 3.5. The fertility rate has not materially changed since then, 
despite renewed high level political commitment to its reduction.
There are several reasons why, despite widespread access and high-level support, 
Egypt’s voluntary family planning may not have yielded a significant drop in fertility 
rates. These include:
• Poor targeting and information campaign: despite physical proximity to clinics;
• Higher income groups were more likely to access family planning in comparison to 
more marginalised high fertility groups;
• Significant reduction in donor support: the reductions in the success of the pro-
gramme were strongly correlated with the ceasing of USAID funding in 2007;
• Quality and awareness: there is a lack of information, including in the secondary ed-
ucation curriculum, and availability of different types and high quality contraceptive 
methods in some clinics. 
Given the multifaceted nature of interventions used to try and induce changes in the fer-
tility rate, it is difficult to identify which specific sub-set of interventions is most effective. 
However, the examples above do demonstrate that it is possible to achieve very quick 
and rapid changes in fertility rates and age dependency ratios. In addition, it is likely that 
increased access to voluntary and modern family planning needs to be combined with 
successful information campaigns, a focus on gender inequalities, tacking social norms, 
support from religious stakeholders and/or enjoy consistent financial support in order to 
be effective.
What Iraq is Doing About Demographic Transition
Iraq has an official voluntary family planning strategy pending final approval.47 Over the 
next four years, the UNFPA plans to support the further expansion of a modern, voluntary 
and rights-based family planning programme aimed at increasing access to modern contra-
ceptive methods from 36 to 45 percent; ensure that youth, women, and marginalised groups 
have access to information about their reproductive choices; and to support the implemen-
tation of a population census, which will make evidence-based decision-making around 
reproductive services possible. Other multilateral agencies are also working to support the 
collection of data essential for making voluntary family planning more effective.48
46   Tamer Rabie, Zuzana Boehmova, Loraine Hawkins, Nahla Abdel Tawab, Sally Saher and Atef El Shitany, 
‘Transforming Family Planning Outlook and Practice in Egypt: A Rights-Based Approach’, World Bank 
(2013). Available at: http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/351971468026087900/pdf/905960WP-
0Box3800July0160FINAL0PROOF.pdf (accessed 24 September 2020).
47   Executive Board of UNDP, UNFPA and UNOPS, ‘Provisional agenda, annotations, list of documents 
and workplan’, United Nations DP/2020/L.1 (2019). Available at: https://www.unfpa.org/sites/default/
files/board-documents/main-document/dp2020L1.19.12.2019.pdf (accessed 24 September 2020).
48   ‘World Bank in Iraq’, World Bank (2019). Available online at: https://www.worldbank.org/en/country/
iraq/overview#2 (accessed 24 September 2020).
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Given Iraq’s atypically large demographic challenge, even the partial implementation of a 
successful rights-based and voluntary family planning programme could facilitate demo-
graphic transition and thereby support the economic and political benefits associated with 
it. This would be especially beneficial in the highly likely event  that COVID-19 induces an 
even larger budget deficit. However, in order to maximise the returns of voluntary family 
planning, and therefore to take advantage of the economic returns of a declining depend-
ency ratio, Iraq must undertake significant economic and welfare reforms. 
Conclusion
A country’s dependency ratio has long been known to affect its economic growth. The 
MENA region, including Iraq, has begun to experience a slow transition away from very 
high dependency ratios due to a falling birth rate but a still small proportion of older age 
cohorts. Iraq is atypical for the region in that its demographic transition is particularly 
slow. The financial and economic effects of Iraq’s slow transition are particularly acute 
because much of the economy, and virtually all government revenues, are associated with 
oil production and export and are insensitive to population change. This is particularly 
salient as approximately 300,000 youths enter the labour market every year. 
Using economic projection developed by the IMF we show that changes in population 
momentum can have a significant effect on spending per capita. Just shifting from the 
median to the high population projection between 2020–4 results in a cumulative fall in 
per capita expenditures equivalent to 0.72% of GDP (or about a 7% cut in healthcare or 9% 
cut in defence spending per capita). Looking at the dynamic economic effects of a slow 
demographic transition we can also see that a failure to  support demographic change can 
significantly slow economic growth per capita, especially as in the case of Iraq where this 
is combined with a hostile business environment. On average, a 1% fall in the dependency 
ratio results in a 1.17% increase in per capita income or 1.18% if combined with a one unit 
decrease in the cost of doing business. 
As evidence from the region shows, and especially neighbouring Iran, it is possible to accel-
erate demographic change. If this is simultaneously combined with economic reforms 
and human capital formation aimed at generating economic growth, then a double demo-
graphic dividend can be realised. Given Iraq’s dependency on oil for government revenues, 
a lack of demographic change may significantly impair the social contract, resulting in 
political instability. Therefore, investment in voluntary and rights-based family planning 
and economic reforms are not just important for material welfare, but also (potentially) 
for political and social stability.
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Annex A: Descriptive Statistics
Table 11: Descriptive Statistics for Section 4
Variable Descriptor Source
Population 
Projections
Total population (both sexes combined) country, annually for 
1950–2100 (thousands). Low/Median/High population projections
United Nations 
Population Division
Fertility Rate Fertility rate, total (births per woman) World Bank
Modern 
Contraception
Contraceptive prevalence, modern methods (% of women ages 
15–49).
World Bank
Table 12: Descriptive Statistics for Section 5
Variable Descriptor Source
(Log) GDP Per 
Capita
GDP per capita is gross domestic product divided by midyear 
population. GDP is the sum of gross value added by all resident 
producers in the economy plus any product taxes and minus any 
subsidies not included in the value of the products. It is calculated 
without making deductions for depreciation of fabricated assets 
or for depletion and degradation of natural resources. Data are in 
constant 2010 US dollars.
World Bank
Age 
Dependency 
Ratio
Age dependency ratio is the ratio of dependents – people younger 
than 15 or older than 64 – to the working-age population – those 
aged 15–64. Data are shown as the proportion of dependents per 
100 working-age population.
World Bank
Ease of Doing 
Business
The cost for men/women is the total cost required for five male/
women married entrepreneurs to complete the procedures 
to incorporate and operate a business. It is calculated as a 
percentage of income per capita. All the fees and costs associated 
with completing the procedures to start a business are recorded, 
including all official fees and fees for legal and professional 
services, if such services are required by law or commonly used 
in practice. Only incorporation costs are counted, which excludes 
value added taxes and bribes.
World Bank (Doing 
Business)
Government 
Expenditure (% 
of GDP)
General government final consumption expenditure (formerly 
general government consumption) includes all government 
current expenditures for purchases of goods and services 
(including compensation of employees). It also includes most 
expenditures on national defence and security but excludes 
government military expenditures that are part of government 
capital formation.
World Bank
Natural 
Resource Rent 
(% of GDP)
Total natural resources rents are the sum of oil rents, natural gas 
rents, coal rents (hard and soft), mineral rents, and forest rents.
World Bank
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Variable Descriptor Source
Overseas 
Development 
Assistance (per 
capita)
Net official development assistance (ODA) per capita consists 
of disbursements of loans made on concessional terms (net of 
repayments of principal) and grants by official agencies of the 
members of the Development Assistance Committee (DAC), by 
multilateral institutions, and by non-DAC countries to promote 
economic development and welfare in countries and territories 
in the DAC list of ODA recipients; and is calculated by dividing 
net ODA received by the midyear population estimate. It includes 
loans with a grant element of at least 25 percent (calculated at a 
rate of discount of 10 percent).
World Bank
Exports (% of 
GDP)
Exports of goods and services represent the value of all goods 
and other market services provided to the rest of the world. 
They include the value of merchandise, freight, insurance, 
transport, travel, royalties, license fees, and other services, such 
as communication, construction, financial, information, business, 
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